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Professor Lynch has given us an interesting and 
challenging paper which covers a great deal of territory. 
One way of dividing up his project is to view it as 
comprising three main parts: 
1. Textual analysis designed to discredit attempts to 
enlist Wittgenstein as an ally in arguments that 
animals without language cannot have conscious 
mental states, or at least some important kinds of 
mental states. I 
2. Further criticisms designed to show that other 
attempts~.g. those associated with Malcolm, 
Davidson, and Stich-to push the same general 
type of argument also fail; and 
3. a brief discussion of the relevance of all this for 
arguments about the moral status of non-linguistic 
animals, in which he argues that such linguistic 
considerations, even if correct, fail to show that 
non-linguistic creatures cannot have rights. More 
importantly, they do not affect the broader 
"psychological and moral connection between 
human and animal" that gives rise to a sense of 
community, sympathy, and sometimes pity. 
Let me comment briefly on each of these. 
It should be emphasized that the sort oflanguage at 
issue here is a public, conventional, systematic 
language. Neither a private Fodor-style language of 
thought (if there is one) nor the ability to send and 
receive "signals" is sufficient to establish the possession 
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of a language in the sense relevant to these debates. 
The sorts of linguistic argument we are considering 
here depend (non-exclusively) on either the Gricean-
style complex social interactions involved in engaging 
in language games or the recognition of one's 
utterances as having semantic properties, including 
meaning and truth-value. 
Lynch has, I believe, convincingly established that 
Wittgenstein freely attributes a wide range of 
psychological states to animals. Thus, it is a mistake to 
cite Wittgenstein in support of claims that animals are 
not conscious.2 However, this should not lead us to 
overlook Wittgenstein's insistence that some states are 
possible only for creatures who possess a language, and 
that engaging in a wide variety of language games is 
essential to human forms of life. Wittgenstein would 
insist that non-linguistic animals are incapable ofa great 
many psychological states simply because they lack a 
public language. This difference does, for Wittgenstein, 
set animals apart from humans in very significant ways 
and entails that the "forms of life" we engage in will be 
very different. In tum, these differences will severely 
restrict the extent to which we can understand or interact 
meaningfully with animals, since understanding and 
interaction presuppose a shared form of life. Without 
such understanding and interaction, it is doubtful that 
Wittgenstein would accept appeals to a moral 
commwlity, such as the one at the end ofLynch's paper. 
Wittgenstein and others present the ability to use 
language as relevant to having certain mental states in 
two distinct ways. The first sees language primarily as 
a tool for representing concepts that may be too complex 
or abstract to be captured by other means, but which 
are necessary in order to have an intentional stale with 
a specific content. Thus, we may be willing to credit a 
dog with the belief that she will be taken out to play 
"soon" (or as George Carlin would have it "RIGHT 
NOW") but not with the belief that she will go home 
next Wednesday. Representing concepts like "every two 
weeks," "the square root oftwo," or perhaps "the finality 
of death" seems to require a certain sort of complex 
language that goes far beyond what we usually attribute 
to most nonhuman animals. 
Second, the ability to use a language may be 
necessary to have certain sorts of mental states: one 
might reasonably think that a bird expects a predator to 
follow her if she behaves in a certain way without 
believing that she is capable of judging that the 
statement "predators are more likely to be distracted 
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by potential prey they believe to be wounded" is true. 
Some, but not all, types of mental states presuppose an 
understanding of how language works. This includes, 
in some cases, an understanding of what it means for a 
statement to be true or false, where this is more complex 
than an understanding that a certain state of affairs does 
or does not obtain. It also may include "second-order" 
beliefs and desires about the expected effects on the 
audience. One might, along these lines, distinguish 
expecting from hoping, simulating pain from pretending 
to be in pain.3 
Neither of these theses about the importance of 
language entails that non-linguistic animals have no 
mental states, but it is still important to recognize the 
difference between them. Wittgenstein clearly thinks 
that both these claims about the role of language are 
true, but many discussions of his view and other 
arguments about the role oflanguage, both positive and 
negative, seem to focus on one version of the claim to 
the exclusion of the other or to collapse the two. Thus, 
when Lynch claims: 
Presumably, Wittgenstein is only contending 
that some mental states are possible only for 
creatures with linguistic capacity. Some 
beliefs, for example, are too finely grained to 
be attributed reasonably to an infralinguistic 
organism. 
he seems to be lumping these two putative functions of 
language competence together. Similarly, Jeffrey's reply 
to Malcolm ~as described in Lynch's paper) focuses on 
what the content of a mental state might be, whereas 
Malcolm is (at least, on the most charitable reading of 
his argument) more interested in what sorts of mental 
states a dog is capable of having. 
Other attempts to use lack of language as a basis for 
attributing lack of (some) mental capacity require the 
same consideration of these two different ways in which 
a lack of language is thought to be significant. Stich is 
clearly concerned with the possible content of beliefs. 
Malcolm, Davidson, and Frey are arguing about the 
possibility of an animal having certain types of mental 
states: states which they think require framing and 
understanding a proposition and, in some cases, 
understanding that propositions are bearers of truth 
value. It may be of interest to note that Dennen, often 
cited by Lynch and others as an ally in the fight to 
attribute mental states to animals, nonetheless argues 
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quite vigorously that a lack of language imposes both 
sorts of limitations on animals.4 
Finally, let me tum briefly to the significance of all 
of this for moral issues about our treatment of animals. I 
agree with Lynch that none of this has any bearing on 
the question of whether animals have rights; that is a 
debate that must be carried out on a separate field. 
However, I think each of the two theses about the 
importance of language raises separate concerns which 
must be considered before we can embrace Lynch's (and 
Diamond's) endorsement ofa sense ofmoral community. 
They do so by suggesting that very significant, morally 
relevant differences may still exist between (normal, 
adult) humans and (nonlinguistic) animals. 
The need for a complex and abstract language in 
fixing the content of mental states has sometimes been 
cited in debates about whether death is a harm for 
animals or whether animals can have a general interest 
in freedom or liberty. If animals cannot form a 
representation of freedom per se (as distinct from the 
representation of "that fence that is preventing me from 
getting away from here"), that may well affect our 
arguments about animal welfare. What sorts of mental 
states a non-linguistic creature is capable of having is 
particularly relevant when considering questions of self-
awareness, autonomy, and self-determination. Is an 
animal capable ofpride, self-awareness, or formulating 
and choosing a life plan? There is, of course, much more 
that needs to be said about these topics, but Lynch's 
analysis provides a useful starting point. 
References Cited 
Carruthers, Peter (1992). The Animals Issue. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Dennett, Daniel (1978). Brainstorms. Montgomery, VT: 
Bradford Books. 
Dennett, Daniel (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston: 
Little, Brown. 
Leahy, Michael (1991, 1994). Against Liberation: Putting 
Animals in Perspective. New York: Routledge. 
Mitchell, R. W. and Thompson, N. S. (eds.)(l986). Deception: 
Perspectives on Human and NonHuman Deceit. Albany: 
SUNY Press 
Notes 
I Lynch is correct in his paraphrase of Singer's remarks. 
However, I think Singer has overstated the scope of the 
arguments to which he refers. Philosophers like Malcolm, 
Winter & Spring 1996 
Russow: Response 
Davidson, and R. G. Frey, who seem to appeal to the 
Wittgensteinian tradition, argue for a more narrow thesis, viz., 
that animals cannot have certain sorts of mental states, 
although they may well possess other conscious states. 
Carruthers argues that animals have no conscious states, and 
does link consciousness with the ability to use a natural 
language, but does not explicitly invoke Wittgenstein. In fact, 
Leahy is the only appropriate target I am aware of, in that he 
explicitly appeals to Wittgenstein in his arguments to show 
that animals lack "awareness." Absent further references from 
Singer, it is difficult to know exactly to whom he wishes to 
attribute the more extreme claim. 
2 We should remember, however, that for Wittgenstein, 
these psychological states should not be thought of as inner, 
private events--either for animals or humans. 
3 For further discussion of the concept of deception, see 
Russow and other papers in Mitchell and Thompson (1986). 
4 In "How to Change Your Mind" (Dennett, 1978), 
Dennett argues that animals can have beliefs, but not opinions. 
They can come to believe, but not decide, assent, or judge. In 
later discussions (e.g., Dennett 1991, ch 8) he analyzes the 
role language plays in determining what the content of our 
beliefs could be. 
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Prof. Russow invokes a distinction regarding the 
relevance of language to mind that she believes is 
overlooked in my paper. First, there is the thesis that 
some mental states involve concepts that seem to be 
too complex to be captured by creatures without 
language; e. g., dogs might have expectations, but dogs 
cannot expect to be taken out next Wednesday. The 
second thesis is that language may be necessary in order 
to have certain types of mental states. Among Russow's 
examples here is understanding what it is for a certain 
proposition to be true. Clearly, such an understanding 
requires language. So, restrictions of the first kind deny 
certain states to animals due to conceptual complexity, 
while restrictions of the second kind restrict which types 
of states might reasonably be attributed to animals. 
Now, this is an interesting distinction, but I don't 
believe it was overlooked-at least not by me. Russow 
says that Wittgenstein presents the relevance of 
language to mentality in these two distinct ways. This 
may be, but there is little evidence that he had this 
distinction in mind. Indeed, in the passage from the 
Investigations cited in the first section of my paper, 
Wittgenstein lumps together restrictions due to 
complexity of conceptual content (dog cannot believe 
his master will come the day after tomorrow but does 
have other beliefs) with restrictions of type (a dog 
cannot be hopeful). 
Nevertheless, Russow's distinction is a meaningful 
one. To exemplify the distinction, she correctly observes 
that Stich focuses on possible belief contents, while 
Malcolm, Davidson, and others are more interested in 
which types ofmental states animals can have. However, 
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